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Abstract
The basic properties of RSA cryptosystems and some classical attacks on them are
described. Derived from geometric properties of the Euler functions, the Euler function
rays, a new ansatz to attack RSA cryptosystems is presented. A resulting, albeit inefficient,
algorithm is given. It essentially consists of a loop with starting value determined by the
Euler function ray and with step width given by a function ωe(n) being a multiple of the
order ordn(e), where e denotes the public key exponent and n the RSA modulus. For
n = pq and an estimate r <√pq for the smaller prime factor p, the running time is given
by T (e,n,r) = O((r− p) lne lnn lnr).
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1 Introduction
Since the revolutionary idea of asymmetric cryptosystems was born in the 1970’s, due to Diffie
and Hellman [4] and Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [9], public key technology became an in-
dispensable part of contemporary electronically based communication. Its applications range
∗This paper is a slight modification of [10]
†e-Mail: de-vries@fh-swf.de
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from authentication to digital signatures and are widely considered to be an essential of future
applications for e-commerce.
The most popular cryptosystem is RSA. There has been numerous, more or less unsuc-
cessful, attacks on RSA. The strongness of RSA bases on the difficulty to factorize integers
as well as to compute the discrete logarithm. For more details, see e.g. [1, 2, 3, 6]; cf. also
http://www.math-it.org
2 RSA cryptosystem
The RSA cryptosystem, named after its inventors Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman
(1978), was the first public key cryptosystem and is still the most important one. It is based
on the dramatic difference between the ease of finding large prime numbers and computing
modular powers on the one hand, and the difficulty of factorizing a product of large prime
numbers as well as inverting the modular exponentiation.
Generally, in a public key system, each participant has both a public key and a private key,
which is held secret. Each key is a piece of information. In the RSA cryptosystem, each key
consists of a group of integers. The participants are traditionally called Alice and Bob, and we
denote their public and secret keys as PA, SA for Alice and PB, SB for Bob. All participants create
their own pair of public and private keys. Each keeps his private key secret, but can reveal his
public key to anyone or can even publish it. It is very convenient that everyone’s public key is
available in a public directory, so that any participant can easily obtain the public key of any
other participant, just like we nowadays can get anyones phone number from a public phone
book.
In the RSA cryptosystem, each participant creates his public and private keys with the fol-
lowing procedure.
1. Select at random two large prime numbers p and q, p 6= q. (The primes might be more
than 200 digits each, i.e. more than 660 bits.)
2. Compute n = pq and the Carmichael function λ (n) = lcm(p−1,q−1).
3. Select an integer d relatively prime to λ (n). (d should be of the magnitude of n, i.e., d /
λ (n).)
4. Compute e as the multiplicative inverse of d modulo λ (n), such that ed = 1 mod λ (n).
This is done efficiently by the extended Euclidean algorithm.
5. Publish the pair P = (e,n) as the public key.
6. Keep secret the pair S = (d,n) as the private or secret key.
For this procedure, the domain of the messages is Zn. For each participant of a cryptosystem,
the four-tuple (e,d, p,q) ∈ N4 is called (individual) RSA key system. The key parameter e is
also called the encryption exponent, d the decryption exponent, and n the RSA modulus.
The encryption of a message m ∈ Zn associated with a public key P = (e,n) is performed
by the function E : Zn → Zn,
E(m) = me mod n. (1)
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The decryption of a ciphertext c ∈ Zn associated with the private key S = (d,n) is done by the
mapping D : Zn → Zn,
D(c) = cd mod n. (2)
The procedure where Alice sends an encrypted message to Bob is schematically shown in
Figure 1. A qualitatively new possibility offered by public key systems (and being unimple-
Figure 1: Alice sends an encrypted message m to Bob, using his public RSA key PB.
mentable with symmetric key systems) is the procedure of digital signature. How an RSA
cryptosystem enables Alice to digitally sign a message and how Bob can verify that it is signed
by Alice is sketched in Figure 2. As a matter of course, this verification in fact is possible only
if the authenticity of Alice’s public key PA is guaranteed such that Bob can assume that it is her
key (and not a third person’s one) which he uses. This guarantee is the job of so-called trust
centers.
Figure 2: Alice sends a digitally signed message to Bob; Bob uses Alice’s public key to decrypt the
message and to verify this way that Alice has signed it with her private key.
The correctness of RSA, i.e., the fact that E and D define inverse functions on Zn (D◦E =
E ◦D = idZn ) relies on the simple fact that
med = m mod n for m ∈ Zn, (3)
which is immediately proved by the corollary of Carmichael A.7, p. 18. For details see, e.g.,
[1, 2, 3].
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Remark 2.1 Often one finds the definition of RSA cryptosystems based on the Euler function
ϕ rather than on the Carmichael function λ , cf. [3]. However, since ϕ(pq) = (p− 1)(q− 1),
both function values ϕ(pq) and λ (pq) share the same divisors. Therefore, a possible key
parameter d relatively prime to λ (pq) is also relatively prime to ϕ(pq), and vice versa. Only
the resulting counter key e may differ. To be more precise, any possible RSA key pair of
a system based on the Euler function is a possible key pair with respect to the Carmichael
function, whereas the reverse is not generally true. (Proof: Since λ (n)|ϕ(n), the equality
ed = 1 mod ϕ(n) implies ed = 1 mod λ (n).) Using the Euler function ϕ , the correctness of
RSA is shown with the Euler theorem A.2 on p. 16, instead of the corollary of Carmichael.
2.1 Properties of an RSA key system
Theorem 2.2 Let p, q ∈N be two primes, p,q > 1, p 6= q. Then the number νpq of all possible
key pairs (P,S) = ((e, pq),(d, pq)) is given by
νpq = ϕ(λ (pq)). (4)
The (trivial) keys with e = d = 1 and with e = d = λ (pq)−1 are always possible, and
2 < νpq <
(p−1)(q−1)
gcd (p−1,q−1) . (5)
Proof. Since ed = 1 mod λ (pq), without restriction to generality we have 0 < e,d < λ (pq).
Moreover, gcd(d,λ (pq)) = gcd(e,λ (pq)) = 1, because for an arbitrary integer a with gcd(a,
λ (pq)) > 1 there exists no b ∈ N such that ab = 1 mod λ (pq). Therefore, e,d ∈ Z∗λ(pq). In
turn, to any a ∈ Z∗λ(pq) there exists an integer b such that ab = 1 mod λ (pq), since Z∗λ(pq) is a
group. But the order of Z∗λ(pq) is exactly ϕ(λ (pq)).
It is clear that 1 · 1 = 1 mod λ (n), so e = d = 1 are always possible as key parameters.
If e = d = λ (pq)− 1, we have ed = λ 2(pq) − 2λ (pq) + 1 = 1 mod λ (pq), so e and d are
always possible, too. By (47), λ (pq) is even and (by pq ≧ 6) greater than 2, so νpq > 2. The
maximum number of elements on the other hand is λ (pq)−1. 
The plot of all possible RSA key parameters (e,d) reveals general symmetries in the (e,d)-
plane. First we observe that if P = (e,n), S = (d,n) is a possible RSA key pair, then trivially
also P′ = (d,n), S′ = (e,n) is possible, because ed = de = 1 mod λ (n). Furthermore, if ed =
1 mod λ (n) and 0 < e,d < λ (n)/2, then
e′ = λ (n)− e, d′ = λ (n)−d (6)
satisfy λ (n)/2 < e′,d′ < λ (n) as well as
e′d′ = λ 2(n)−λ (n)(e+ d)+ ed = ed mod λ (n).
Therefore, P′ = (e′,n) and S′ = (d′,n) are possible RSA keys, too.
To sum up, all possible RSA key parameters (e,d), plotted in the square lattice [0,λ (n)−
1]2 ⊂N2 with edges ranging from 0 to λ (n)−1, form a pattern which is symmetric to both the
principal and the secondary square diagonals, see Figure 3. Thus, the region
U = {(e,d) ∈ [0,λ (n)−1]2 : 0 < d ≦min(e,λ (n)− e)} (7)
contains all information to generate the rest of the square lattice by reflections at the main
diagonal (d ↔ e) and at the secondary diagonal (6).
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Figure 3: Plots of the possible RSA key parameter pairs (e,d) ∈ [0,λ (n)− 1]2 for different primes p
and q, represented as points in the (e,d)-plane. For the first plot, p = 11 and q = 83, for the second one
p = 19 and q = 131. The shaded region is U as given by (7).
2.2 Classical RSA attacks
There are several specific methods to break an RSA cryptosystem. The initial situation for an
attack is that an eavesdropper knows the public key P = (e,n) and the encrypted message c.
For details see, e.g., [1] and [2, §7].
2.2.1 Factorization of the RSA modulus n
If the eavesdropper succeeds in finding the factorization n = pq of n, knowing e he can easily
compute d. But factorization of numbers n = pq with
p,q > 10200 (8)
(hence n > 10400, i.e., n has length more than about 1320 bits), is difficult with current tech-
nology, if p and q differ enough,
|p−q|> 10100. (9)
Otherwise n can be factorized efficiently by exhaustive search of two integers n+ and n− satis-
fying n = n2+ − n2−, beginning at n+ = ⌈
√
n⌉ and n− = 0. These two integers then necessarily
obey n± = p±q2 .
It can be proved that, knowing the public key (e,n), factorizing the RSA modulus n is as
difficult as finding the secret key (d,n), see [2, §7.2.5].
Factorization is the most efficient known attack on RSA. The fastest known factorization
method, the number field sieve of John Pollard in 1988, yields running times for a 10 GHz
computer as given in Table 1.
2.2.2 Chosen-plaintext attack
The eavesdropper systematically encrypts all messages m with Bob’s public key PB until he
achieves the ciphertext c. This attack is efficient if the set of messages m is small or if the
5
magnitude of the number bits operations CPU time
n ≈ 1050 167 1.4 ·1010 14 seconds
n ≈ 1075 250 9 ·1012 2.5 hours
n ≈ 10100 330 2.3 ·1015 26.6 days
n ≈ 10200 665 1.2 ·1023 3.8 mio years
n ≈ 10300 1000 1.5 ·1029 4.9 ·1012 years
Table 1: CPU times for factorizing of numbers n on a 10 GHz computer.
message m is short.
“Pad” each message such that its size is of the magnitude of the
modulus. Use “probabilistic encryption,” where a given plaintext
is mapped onto several ciphertexts.
(10)
2.2.3 Chosen-ciphertext attack
There is a similar method, the chosen-ciphertext attack, which can be applied if Bob signs a
document with his private key. The eavesdropper receiving the ciphertext c and wishing to find
the decryption m = cd mod n chooses a random integer s and asks Bob to digitally sign the
innocent-looking message c˜ = sec mod n. From his answer m˜ = c˜d it is easy to recover the
original message, because m = m˜/s mod n.
Never sign unknown documents; before signing a document, al-
ways apply a one-way hash function to it. (11)
2.2.4 Message iteration
Let be ci ∈ Zn be iteratively defined as
c0 = m, ci = c
e
i−1 mod n (i = 1,2, . . .).
In fact, ci = me
i
mod n, and c1 = c is the ciphertext. The smallest index k with ck+1 = c1 is the
iteration exponent or period of m, cf. definition 3.3: it exactly shows (!) the original message,
ck = m.
Such a period k uniquely exists, it is the order of e modulo λ (n), k = ordλ(n)(e), cf. (15). Thus
it divides λ (λ (n)) and ϕ(λ (n)). To avoid an efficient attack by iteration, λ (λ (n)) and the order
of e with respect to λ (n) have to be large,
λ (λ (n)), ordλ(n)(e) > 10200. (12)
This condition is satisfied for so-called “doubly safe primes” p and q: A prime p is doubly safe,
if both (p−1)/2 and (p−3)/4 are primes. For instance, 11, 23, 47, 167, 359 are doubly safe
primes. A doubly safe prime p 6= 11 always has the form 24a−1, or p = −1 mod 24. For two
doubly safe primes p, q, we have λ (pq) = 2 p−12
q−1
2 , and therefore λ (λ (pq)) = lcm(2,
p−3
2 ,
q−3
2 ) =
1
2
p−3
2
q−3
2 = (p−3)(q−3)/8.
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2.2.5 Broadcast decryption by the low-exponent attack
In general, it may be convenient to use a small public key parameter e such that the encryption
of a message is easy to compute (for instance for a small chip card). However, suppose Alice
sends the same message to l different participants whose public keys are Pi = (e,ni) where
the ni’s are relatively prime to each other and l ≦ e; to emphasize, the public keys have the
same encryption exponent e. If an eavesdropper receives the l ciphertexts c′i = me mod ni, he
can easily compute c′ = c′i mod n1 · · ·nl by the Chinese remainder theorem. But if the product
n1 · · ·nl is great enough, this is the same as c′ = me. This equation is invertible, viz., m = e
√
c′,
and the original message is computed. To avoid this attack, each pair of public keys Pi = (ei,ni)
Pj = (e j,n j) and any broadcast message m must satisfy
ei 6= e j or mei , me j > nin j (13)
2.2.6 Broadcast decryption by the common modulus attack
If a plain text m is encrypted twice by the RSA system using two public keys Pi = (ei,n),
i = 1,2, with a common modulus n and gcd(e1,e2) = 1, then m can be recovered efficiently
from the two ciphertexts c1 and c2, each of which given by ci = mei mod n. This is done by the
following procedure.
1. Compute x1, x2 satisfying x1e1 + x2e2 = 1 by the extended Euclidean algorithm, where
the indices are chosen such that x2 < 0.
2. Determine y satisfying 1 = yc2 + kn by the extended Euclidean algorithm.
3. Calculate c1x1 y−x2 — this is the plain text!
The reason is that c1x1 y−x2 = c1x1 c2x2 = mx1e1+x2e2 = m mod n. E.g., let be P1 = (3,493) and
P2 = (5,493), and the corresponding ciphertexts c1 = 293 and c2 = 421. Then the extended
Euclidean algorithm yields x1 = 2 and x2 = −1, and thus y = 89 and k = −76 (such that 89
· 421 − 76 · 493 = 1); finally, 2932 · 891 = 67 · 89 = 5963 = 47 mod n, i.e. m = 47 is the
plaintext. In fact, 493 = 17 · 29, and S1 = (17, 29, 75), S2 = (17, 29, 45), and m = c751 = c452
= 47 mod 493.
Therefore, to avoid common modulus attacks, a sender should regard:
Never send identical messages to receivers with the same modu-
lus and relatively prime encryption exponents. (14)
3 The Euler function ray attack
3.1 The ω-function and the order of a number modulo n
Definition 3.1 Let be n ∈ N, n > 1, and Z∗n the multiplicative group modulo n. Then the order
ordn(m) of m ∈ Z∗n is given by
ordn(m) = min{k ∈ N : k > 0, mk = 1 mod n}. (15)
If gcd (m,n) > 1, ordn(m) = ∞.
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Let 〈m〉 denote the subgroup of Z∗n generated by m. E.g., 〈2〉 = {1, 2, 4} in Z7, and ord7(2) =
3. Note that ϕ(7) = λ (7) = 6.
Lemma 3.2 Let be m,n ∈N, with gcd(m,n) = 1 and m < n. Then
ordn(m) | λ (n). (16)
Moreover,
⌈logm n⌉≦ ordn(m)≦ λ (n) ≦ n−1. (17)
Proof. With Carmichael’s theorem A.4 and with the Lagrange theorem [3, §33] equation (16)
is deduced.
Let a = ordm(n). Since m > 1, we have ma > n to obtain m = 1 mod n. This implies
a > logm n. The upper limits follow from the relations (55) and (16). 
Definition 3.3 Let be m,n,e ∈N, n > 1, and define the sequence (c0, c1, c2, . . . ) iteratively by
c0 = m, ci = c
e
i−1 mod n (i = 1,2, . . .). (18)
Then the smallest k ≧ 1 such that ck = c0 is called (n,e)-iteration exponent s(n, e, m) of m. It
is the period of the cycle (c0, c1, . . . , cs(n,e,m)−1) to which m belongs. A cycle with period one
is a fixed point.
Lemma 3.4 Let be e,m,n and the sequence (c0,c1,c2, . . .) as in definition 3.3. Let moreover
be e relatively prime to λ (n). Then the (n,e)-iteration exponent s(n,e,m) satisfies
s(n,e,m) | λ (λ (n)). (19)
Proof. Note that for the sequence (18) we have ci = mei mod n. For s(n,e,m) we thus have
me
s(n,e,m)
= me mod n. (20)
By (54) we have es(n,e,m) = e mod λ (n), which implies by definition 3.3 that ordλ(n)(e) =
s(n,e,m). Relation (16) yields the assertion. 
Example 3.5 Let be e = 7, n = 55 = 5 · 11. Then we have λ (55) = 20, and λ (λ (55)) = 4.
Denoting c0 = 51, we obtain
c1 = 517 mod 55 = 6
c2 = 67 mod 55 = 41
c3 = 417 mod 55 = 46
c4 = 467 mod 55 = 51 = c0
Hence, the period of the cycle which 51 belongs to is s(n,e,m) = 4. Note by (19) that this is
the maximum value. Analogously, there are the following cycles.
9 fixed points (0), (1), (10), (11), (21), (34), (44), (45), (54)
3 cycles of period 2 (12, 23), (22, 33), (32,43)
10 cycles of period 4 ( 2, 18, 17, 8), ( 3, 42, 48, 27)
( 4, 49, 14, 9), ( 5, 25, 20, 15)
( 6, 41, 46, 51), ( 7, 28, 32, 13)
(16, 36, 31, 26), (19, 24, 29, 39)
(30, 35, 40, 50), (37, 38, 47, 53)
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Definition 3.6 Let be m,n ∈ Z, n≧ 0. Then we define the function
ωm(n) =
{
ordn(m) if gcd(m,n) = 1,
0 if gcd(m,n) 6= 1. (21)
It is obvious that mωm(n) = 1 mod n for any m,n ∈ Z, n ≧ 0 (since this is the definition of the
order function). Substituting n by ωm(n) immediately yields
mωm(ωm(n)) = 1 mod ωm(n). (22)
Here “a = b mod 0” has to be understood as a congruence in Z, i.e. as “a = b.” By iteration,
we obtain the cascading-ω equation
mω
(r)
m (n) = 1 mod ω(r−1)m (n), where r ≧ 1. (23)
where ω(r)m (n) = ωm(ωm(. . . (ωm(n)) . . .)) denotes the r-fold composition of ωm.
Theorem 3.7 Let be d,e,n ∈ N, such that n > 1, gcd(e,n) = 1, and d · e = 1 mod λ (n). Then
ωe(ωe(n)) > 0, and
d = eωe(ωe(n))−1 mod ωe(n). (24)
Proof. First we note by (16) that ωe(n) | λ (n). Therefore, de = 1 mod λ (n) implies
d · e = 1 mod ωe(n). (25)
(If de− 1 = kλ (n) for a k ∈ Z, then de− 1 = k′ωe(n), where k′ = kλ (n)/ωe(n).) If we had
now ωe(ωe(n)) = 0, then e would divide ωe(n) and hence λ (n): But then there would be no d
with de = 1 mod λ (n). Hence, ωe(ωe(n)) > 0. Moreover, by the cascading-ω equation (22)
we have
eωe(ωe(n))−1 · e = 1 mod ωe(n). (26)
Equation (24) follows immediately from (25) and (26). 
Example 3.8 Let be n = 221 and e = 11. Then ω11(221) = 48, ω11(48) = 4, hence
d = 113 = 35 mod 48.
Therefore, the possible d < 221 are d = 35, 83, 131, 179. In fact, 221 = 13 · 17, and λ (221)
= 48; this means that 11 ·35 = 1 mod λ (221), or d = 35.
The two shoulders on which Theorem 3.7 rests are equations (25) and (26). They can be
extended to analogues for the following corollary.
Corollary 3.9 Let be e,n,a,b∈N such that n > 1 and gcd(e,n)= 1, as well as λ (n) |ωe(aωe(n)).
Then the integer
˜d = ebωe(aωe(n))−1 mod aωe(n) (27)
satisfies ˜de = 1 mod aωe(n), and for any number m ∈ Zn we have
me
˜d = m mod n. (28)
If the integer a is such that ωe(aωe(n)) | λ (n), then the unique d < λ (n) with de = 1 mod λ (n)
is related to ˜d by
d = ˜d mod aωe(n). (29)
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Proof. Substituting n by aωe, from eωm(n) = 1 mod n for any m ∈ Z we deduce that ebωe(aωe(n))
= 1 mod aωe(n). Especially, with (27) we have
˜d · e = ebωe(aωe(n))−1 · e = 1 mod aωe(n). (30)
If λ (n) | ωe(aωe(n)), we have m ˜de mod aωe(n) mod n = m1 mod aωe(n) mod n = m1 mod λ(n) mod n
= m mod n. (Note that λ (n) enters the scene in the second last equation to fulfill the equation
for all m!) In turn, if ωe(aωe(n)) | λ (n), then ˜de = 1 mod λ (n) implies ˜de = 1 mod aωe(n);
thus (29) follows from (30). 
Example 3.10 Let be n = 143 and e = 47. Then ω47(143) = 20, and with a = 2, b = 3, we
have 3ω47(40) = 12, hence
d = 4711 = 23 mod 40.
Therefore, med = m1081 = m mod 143. In fact, 143 = 11 · 13, and λ (143) = 60; this means
that 47 ·23 = 1 mod λ (143), or d = 23.
Remark 3.11 Given two relatively prime integers e and n, corollary 3.9 enables us to choose
an (almost) arbitrary multiple of the order ordn(e) > 0 to find an integer d being a kind of
“inverse” of e: If the multiple is small enough such that it divides λ (n), our result supplies a
list of values, one of which satisfies ed = 1 mod λ (n); if the multiple is also a multiple of λ (n),
we can compute ˜d such that ˜de = 1 mod aordn(e). In particular, by (47) and (16) the Euler
function is a multiple of both λ (n) and ordn(e).
3.2 Properties of composed numbers n = pq
Let be p, q be two primes, p 6= q. Then n = pq is an integer composed of two primes. Among
the integers n less than 50 there are 13 ones composed of two primes, n = pq, whereas less
than 100 there are 30 ones, shown in the following tables.
n 6 10 14 15 21 22 26 33 34 35 38 39 46 51 55
ϕ(n) 2 4 6 8 12 10 12 20 16 24 18 24 22 32 40
λ (n) 2 4 6 4 6 10 12 10 16 12 18 12 22 16 20
n 57 58 62 65 69 74 77 82 85 86 87 91 93 94 95
ϕ(n) 36 28 30 48 44 36 60 40 64 42 56 72 60 46 72
λ (n) 18 28 30 12 22 36 30 40 16 42 28 12 30 46 36
Let us now study the geometric structure of the Euler function.
Theorem 3.12 Let n = pq be a positive integer, composed of two primes p and q with p < q.
For any integer pmin ∈ N satisfying pmin ≦ p we then have
ϕ(n)≧ (pmin−1)
(
n
pmin
−1
)
. (31)
The inequality is strict, if pmin < p,q.
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Proof. We have ϕ(n) = (p−1)
(
n
p
−1
)
, and ϕ(n) is a function of p:
g(p) = ϕ(n) = n− p− n
p
+ 1.
Since g′(p) =−1+n/p2 < 0, for fixed n the function g is strictly decreasing with respect to p,
as long as p < q, i.e. as n/p2 > 1. 
Geometrically, this result means that in the graph of ϕ(n) the point (n,ϕ(n)) lies above the
“Euler function ray” (see Figure 4)
fp(x) =
(
x,(p−1)
(
x
p
−1
))
. (32)
Figure 4: Plot of the Euler function ϕ(pq), with p, q prime; also sketched are the rays fp for p = 2, 3,
5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23.
Theorem 3.13 Let be p, q two primes p < q, e an integer with e > 1, and n = pq. Moreover
define for a ∈ N the exponents δe,n, γe,a ∈ N by
δe,n = max{i ∈ N : ei ≦ n}=
⌊
lnn
lne
⌋
, γe,a = max{i ∈ N : ei | a}, (33)
as well as
r± =
1
2
(
∆±
√
∆2−4n
)
with ∆ = p+ q+ δe,n. (34)
Then for any integers b, r ∈ N, r− ≦ r ≦ p or q≦ r ≦ r+, satisfying
be⌊ f (r)⌋ = 1 mod n, where f (r) = (r−1)
(n
r
−1
)
, (35)
the Euler function value ϕ(n) can be computed by
ϕ(n) = γe,b + ⌊ f (r)⌋ (36)
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Proof. Note first that real values for r± always exist since the term in the square root is positive,
∆2 > (p + q)2, i.e. ∆2− 4n > (q− p)2 > 0. We see that (p− 1)(q− 1)− (r− 1)(n/r−1) =
1
r
(r2 −∆r + n). Solving this quadratic equation with respect to r, straightforward calculation
thus shows that the inequalities for r are equivalent to the inequalities
0≦ (p−1)(q−1)− (r−1)
(n
r
−1
)
≦ δe,n, (37)
which means that 0≦ ϕ(n)− (r−1)( n
r
−1)≦ δe,n. On the other hand, b being the multiplica-
tive inverse of er by the modular equation in (35), we have b = e j mod n for some j ∈ N, in
particular for j = ϕ(n)− r. But if j < δe,n, we have b = e j, and j = γe,b. 
Example 3.14 Let be p = 11, q = 13, and e = 7. Then δ7,143 = 2, and thus ∆ = 26, r± = 13
± √26. So r shall satisfy 8≦ r ≦ 11 or 13≦ r ≦ 18. For r = 8, e.g., we have
(r−1)
(n
r
−1
)
= 7 ·16.875 = 118.125;
Since 7118 = 108 mod 143, we achieve by the extended Euclidean algorithm b = 49 = 72
(because 1 = 49 ·108−37 ·143), and with γ7,49 = 2 we obtain
ϕ(143) = 118+ γ7,49 = 120.
In fact, ϕ(143) = 10 ·12. 
Example 3.15 Let be p = 3 336 670 033, q = 9 876 543 211, and e = 2. Then
n = 32954765761773295963,
δ2,n = 64, and thus
∆ = 13213213308, r− = 3336670000.3, r+ = 9876543307.6.
For r = 9 876 543 308, e.g., we have
i = (r−1)
(n
r
−1
)
= 32954765748560082656.
Since
2i = 7542048005965299043 mod n,
we achieve by the extended Euclidean algorithm
b = 18446744073709551616
and with γ2,b = 64 we obtain
ϕ(n) = i+ γ2,b = 32954765748560082720.

The following lemma tells us the grade of “coarse graining,” i.e., a step-width that a sys-
tematic and definite search for an appropriate Euler function ray factor r must use.
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Lemma 3.16 Let p, q be two primes, p < q, e an integer e > 1, and n = pq. Moreover let r+
and δe,n be defined as in theorem 3.13 by equations (33) and (34). Then
r+−q > δe,n2 . (38)
Moreover,
p− r− > δe,n2 if δe,pq <
2
3(3p−q). (39)
Proof. By ∆2 − 4pq = (q− p)2 + 2(p+ q)δe,pq + δ 2e,pq we achieve for δe,pq > 0
r+ =
1
2
(
∆ +
√
∆2−4pq
)
=
1
2
(
∆ +
√
(q− p)2 + 2(p+ q)δe,pq + δ 2e,pq
)
>
1
2
(∆ + q− p) = 1
2
(2q+ δe,pq) = q+
δe,pq
2
.
Analogously, by (39) we have 2(q− p)+ 32 δe,pq < q+ p, i.e. (q− p)2 +2(q+ p)δe,pq +δ 2e,pq >
(q− p)2 + 4(q− p)δe,pq + 4δ 2e,pq = (q− p+ 2δe,pq)2, i.e.
r− =
1
2
(
∆−
√
(q− p)2 + 2(p+ q)δe,pq + δ 2e,pq
)
<
1
2
(
∆−
√
(q− p)2 + 4(p−q)δe,pq + 4δ 2e,pq
)
=
1
2
(∆−q+ p−2δe,pq) = p− δe,pq2 .

3.3 The algorithm
An algorithm to break an RSA cryptosystem is shown below in pseudocode. It is invoked
with the public key (e,n) and the estimate r for the Euler function ray as input parameters and
returns a possible private RSA key parameter d corresponding to e. If it fails, d ≦ 0 is returned.
long rayAttack ( e, n, r ) {
// store an array a such that a[i] = mˆ(2ˆi) < n:
a[0] = e;
j = 1;
while ( a[j-1] < n ) {
a[j] = a[j-1] * a[j-1];
j++;
}
delta = 0;
while ( eˆ(delta + 1) <= n ) delta++;
step = delta / 2;
d = 0; r = nˆ(1/2);
while ( d == 0 && r > 0 ) {
ord = omega(e,n,r);
if ( ord > 0 ) d = euclid( e, ord )[0];
else r -= step;
}
return d;
}
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The heart of algorithm rayAttack is the algorithm ω(m,n,r) determining an integer i being a
multiple of ordn(e) on the basis of corollary 3.9. Both algorithms use the extended Euclidean
algorithm euclid. In detail:
/** returns minimum i >= (r - 1) * (n/r - 1) such that mˆi = 1 mod n
* returns 0 if i is not computable, and -1 if the algorithm fails
*/
long omega( m, n, r ) {
if ( gcd(m,n) != 1 ) return 0;
else {
i = (r - 1) * (n/r - 1);
m = m % n;
// determine b such that b * mˆi = 1 mod n:
b = euclid (n, ( mˆi % n ) )[1] mod n;
// determine maximum exponent gamma such that mˆgamma divides b:
gamma = 0;
for ( k = a.length - 1; k >= 0; k-- ) {
if ( b >= a[k] ) {
if ( b % a[k] == 0 ) {
gamma += 2ˆk;
b /= a[k];
}
else break; // not a power of e
}
}
i += gamma;
if ( i > 0 && b != 1 ) {
i = - 1; // algorithm fails!
}
return i;
}
}
The classical Euclidean algorithm reads:
// euclid(m,n) = extended Euclidean algorithm
// returning x0, x1 s.t. gcd(m,n) = x0 * m + x1 * n:
long[] euclid( long m, long n) {
x[] = {1,0};
u = 0, v = 1;
mNegative = false, nNegative = false;
if ( m < 0 ) { m = -m; mNegative = true; }
if ( n < 0 ) { n = -n; nNegative = true; }
while ( n > 0 ) {
// determine q and r such that m = qn + r:
q = m / n; r = m % n;
// replace:
m = n; n = r;
tmp = u; u = x[0] - q*u; x[0] = tmp;
tmp = v; v = x[1] - q*v; x[1] = tmp;
}
if ( mNegative ) x[0] = -x[0];
if ( nNegative ) x[1] = -x[1];
return x;
}
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3.3.1 Complexity analysis
First we note that the running time Teuclid(m,n) of Euclid’s algorithm for two input integers
m,n is given by
Teuclid(m,n) = logφ [(3−φ) ·max(m,n)], (40)
where φ is the golden ratio φ = (1 +√5)/2, see [5, §4.5.3, Corollary L (p.360)]. If we con-
sider, to simplify, the running time as the number of loops to be performed, we therefore we
achieve for the running time Tω(m,n,r) of the ω-function Tω(m,n,r) = Tpow(m,⌊ f (r)⌋) +
Teuclid(n,m⌊ f (r)⌋ mod n)+ 12 logm n+
1
2 logm n, i.e. [2, §2.12]
Tω(m,n,r) = log2⌊ f (r)⌋ · (log2 n)2 + logφ [(3−φ)n]+ logm n. (41)
Since the complexity Tray(e, pq,r) of the ray Attack algorithm (with n = pq) then is given by
Tray(e, pq,r) =
r− p
loge pq
Tω(e, pq,r)+ Teuclid(e,ω(e, pq,r)),
and since by ω(e, pq,r) < n we have Teuclid(e,ω(e, pq,r)) < Teuclid(e, pq), we obtain
Tray(e, pq,r) <
(
r− p
loge pq
+ 1
)
logφ [(3−φ) pq]
+ (r− p)
(
1+
log2⌊ f (r)⌋ · (log2 pq)2
loge pq
)
= O((r− p) ln r · lne · ln pq) . (42)
(Note that f (r) = O(r).)
4 Discussion
In this article a new ansatz to attack RSA cryptosystems is described, basing on geometric
properties of the Euler functions, the Euler function rays. However, a resulting algorithm
turns out to be inefficient. It essentially consists of a loop with starting value determined
by the Euler function ray and with step width given by a function ωe(n) being a multiple of
the order ordn(e), where e denotes the public key exponent and n the RSA modulus. For
n = pq and an estimate r < √pq for the smaller prime factor p, the running time is given by
T (e,n,r) = O((r− p) lne lnn lnr).
In other words, this attack is queuing up into a long series of failed attacks on RSA. So,
what is gained in the end? First, we achieved a small mathematical novelty, the Euler function
rays, i.e. geometrical properties of the Euler function. To my knowledge they have never been
mentioned before. Second, the ω-function has been introduced, being closely related to the
order of a number but being more appropriate for practical purposes. Finally, this trial as
another failure in fact is good news. It seems that e-commerce basing on RSA can go on.
A Appendix
A.1 Euler’s Theorem
If n is a prime, the set of all numbers (more exactly: of all residue classes) modulo n is a field
with respect to addition and multiplication, as is well known. However, if n is a composite
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integer, the ring of all numbers modulo n is not a field, because the cancellation of a number
(more exactly: a congruence) modulo n by any divisor d of n also requires the corresponding
cancellation of n, and thus carries us from the ring modulo n to another ring, namely modulo
n/d. In this case, d is said to be a zero divisor of the ring, since d|n and n = n/d = 0 mod n/d.
For instance, for n = 9 the congruence
15 = 6 mod 9
is cancelled by d = 3 through
15
d =
6
d mod
9
gcd(d,9) , or 5 = 2 mod 3.
However, if we avoid the zero divisors of n and consider only the those numbers (more exactly:
primitive residue classes) a mod n with gcd(a,n) = 1, then all divisions by these elements can
be uniquely performed. For example, by gcd(5,12) = 1
5x = 10 mod 12 ⇐⇒ x = 2 mod 12.
These numbers actually constitute a multiplicative group of order ϕ(n):
Definition A.1 For n∈N, n > 1, Euler’s ϕ-function or totient function assigns to n the number
ϕ(n) of positive integers k < n relatively prime to n, i.e.
ϕ(n) = #Z∗n, where Z∗n = {k ∈ N : k < n and gcd(k,n) = 1}. (43)
Z
∗
n is the multiplicative group modulo n. For instance, the set of numbers less than 12 and
relatively prime to 12 are {1, 5, 7, 11}, and thus ϕ(12) = 4. An explicit formula denotes
ϕ(n) = pα1−11 · · · pαr−1r · (p1−1) · · · (pr −1) = n ·∏
p|n
(
1− 1
p
)
, (44)
if the prime factorization of n is given by n = pα11 · · · pαrr . E.g., 12 = 22 ·3, and
ϕ(12) = 2 ·2 = 12
(
1− 1
2
)(
1− 13
)
= 4.
Theorem A.2 (Euler’s Theorem) If gcd (m,n) = 1, then
mϕ(n) = 1 mod n. (45)
For a proof see, e.g., [7, §4.1].
A.2 The Carmichael function and Carmichael’s Theorem
Euler’s Theorem can be strengthened. As we will see, this will yield an efficient determination
of key pairs of a RSA public key cryptosystem, much more efficient than the originally (and
yet nowadays in many textbooks) proposed procedure based on Euler’s Theorem.
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Definition A.3 For n ∈ N let n = ∏ri=1 pαi be its prime factorisation. Then the Carmichael1
function λ is given by λ (n) = lcm [λ (pαii )]i, where for each i = 1, . . . ,r,
λ (pαii ) =
{
2αi−2 if pi = 2 and αi ≧ 3,
pαi−1i (pi−1) otherwise.
(46)
For n > 2, λ (n) is even (since pi − 1 as an even integer divides λ (n)); for n = 2, we have
simply λ (2) = ϕ(2) = 1. Moreover, since λ (n) is the least common multiple of factors of ϕ(n),
it divides the Euler totient function:
2 | λ (n) | ϕ(n) for n > 2. (47)
Theorem A.4 (Carmichael’s Theorem) If m,n ∈ N and gcd (m,n) = 1, then
mλ(n) = 1 mod n. (48)
Moreover, λ (n) is the smallest exponent with this property.
Using Carmichael’s Theorem, we have a way of explicitly writing down the quotient of two
residue classes a/b mod n. The formula is
a
b = ab
−1 = abλ(n)−1 mod n, if gcd (b,n) = 1, (49)
i.e. b−1 = bλ(n)−1 mod n.
Example A.5 For n = 65 520 = 24 · 32 · 5 · 7 · 13, Euler’s function assumes the value ϕ(n) =
8 · 6 · 4 · 6 · 12 = 13 824, while λ (n) = lcm(4, 6, 4, 6, 12) = 12. For all m with gcd (m,n) = 1
we thus have
m12 = 1 mod 65520.
For each m with gcd(b,n) = 1 we have m−1 = m11 mod 65520. For instance,
1
11
= 1111 = 47651 mod 65520.
Theorem A.6 If n ∈N is a product of distinct primes, i.e. n = ∏i pi, then
mλ(n)+1 = m mod n for all m ∈ Z. (50)
For a proof see, e.g., [8, §A2].
If the multiplicative group Z∗n = {m : 1≦m,gcd(m,n) = 1} decomposes into the subgroups
Gi,
Z
∗
n = G1×G2× . . .×Gk, (51)
and if di is the order of the group Gi, then each element m ∈ Z∗n can be written in the form
m = ge11 g
e2
2 · · ·gekk with 1≦ ei ≦ di. (52)
1Robert D. Carmichael (1879 – 1967), U.S. mathematician
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Furthermore, for each i,
gdii = 1 mod n, with di|λ (n). (53)
For instance, Z15 = {1,2,4,7,8,11,13,14}. We see that ϕ(15) = 8 = #Z15. All possible
subgroups Gi of Z15 are the following ones.
G1 = {1}, G2 = {1,4}, G3 = {1,11}, G4 = {1,14},
G5 = {1,2,4,8}, G6 = {1,4,7,13}.
Hence d1 = 1, d2 = d3 = d4 = 2, and d5 = d6 = 4. They all divide λ (15) = 4.
Corollary A.7 Let be e,m,n∈N, n > 1, and either n a product of distinct primes, or gcd (m,n)=
1. Then for all e ∈ N
me = me mod λ(n) mod n. (54)
Lemma A.8 For n ∈ N,
λ (n)≦ n−1. (55)
Proof. Because λ (p) < p for every prime, λ (n) < n as the least common multiple of the
Carmichael function values of the prime factors of n. 
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